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ABSTRACT 
In the immediate postwar period, Moses Abramovitz and Robert Solow both 
examined data on output and input growth from the first half of the twentieth century and 
reached similar conclusions.  In the twentieth century, in contrast with the nineteenth, a 
much smaller fraction of real output growth could be swept back to the growth of inputs 
conventionally measured. The rise of the residual, they suggested, was an important 
distinguishing feature of twentieth century growth. This paper identifies two difficulties 
with this claim. First, TFP growth virtually disappeared in the U.S. between 1973 and 
1995.  Second, TFP growth was in fact quite robust between the end of the Civil War and 
1906, as was in fact acknowledged by Abramovitz in his 1993 EHA Presidential address.  
Developing a revised macroeconomic narrative is essential in reconciling our 
interpretation of these numbers with what we know about scientific, technological, and 
organizational change during the gilded age. 
Introduction 
In the immediate postwar period, Moses Abramovitz and Robert Solow both 
examined data on output and input growth for the United States and reached striking and 
similar conclusions.  The pattern of disembodied technical change in the United States 
appeared to be markedly different in the twentieth century as compared with the 
nineteenth.  In the twentieth century, a much smaller fraction of real output growth could 
be swept back to the growth of inputs conventionally measured: the residual, 
correspondingly, was much larger.  Abramovitz published his findings in 1956, Solow in 
1957, and their generalization rapidly became accepted as identifying a permanent 
change in the sources of economic advance. At the end of his career, Abramovitz 
continued to characterize the twentieth century as experiencing “Growth in the Era of 
Knowledge Based Progress”, distinguishing it from the nineteenth (Abramovitz and 
David, 2000).1  
Solow’s 1957 study examined data covering the four decades between 1909 and 
1949; Abramovitz’s 1956 study examined growth up through an end period that averaged 
data between 1944 and 1953.  The big acceleration in TFP growth during the interwar 
years (see below) surely colored their conclusions. Yet, as an examination of the U.S. 
growth experience during the last part of the twentieth century makes clear, their 
generalization about the nature of twentieth century growth was premature.  After a lag 
1 TFP advance is often equated with disembodied technological change, which should be understood 
broadly.  The residual captures growth in output not attributable to growth in inputs conventionally 
measured.  This may be the consequence of organizational innovation.  It can also reflect shifts in the 
economy from sectors with lower to those with higher productivity, as well as quality improvements in 
inputs not otherwise accounted for.   Some of these considerations imply that TFP growth may 
overestimate the effect on output per hour of technological change narrowly defined, but it can also 
underestimate it to the degree the latter raises the return to capital, inducing higher saving, or skews income 
to households with higher income and higher propensities to save,  in either case leading to rises in capital 
labor ratios.  Those who devote time to refining these estimates must, however, believe that they tell us 
something of interest about the sources of economic growth.  Abramovitz was famous for characterizing 
TFP growth as a “measure of our ignorance,” but he also clearly felt that measures of the rate of advance of 
the residual bore some relationship to the growth of (useful) knowledge.  
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during the war period (1941-48), TFP growth persisted at high although somewhat more 
modest rates during the golden age (1948-73).  But it then ground to an almost complete 
halt between 1973 and 1995.  Output per hour continued to rise, albeit much more slowly, 
but this was almost entirely attributable to physical capital deepening.  Data are now 
available for the entire century, and it is no longer possible to interpret the high rate of 
TFP advance during the interwar years that prompted the Abramovitz/Solow 
generalization as a defining characteristic of the century as a whole.   
The collapse of TFP growth after 1973 is, however, only one aspect of the difficulty 
with the Abramovitz/Solow claim.  The other is that TFP growth in the last part of the 
nineteenth century was in fact robust relative to long run historical trends, and indeed, far 
stronger than it was in the last part of the twentieth.  It looks modest only in comparison 
with the exceptional performance in the second and third quarters of the twentieth 
century, but that would be true of almost any other period held up for comparison. The 
available data simply do not support the suggestion that almost all growth in the last third 
of the nineteenth century can be swept back to inputs conventionally measured.  
The principal statistical source for this investigation is Kendrick (1961).  
Kendrick’s work has been the starting point for almost all modern research on U.S. 
productivity growth prior to 1948.  In the 1950s both Abramovitz and Solow worked with 
his then unpublished data, Abramovitz and David (1973) used Kendrick for their post 
1909 analysis, and recent papers, such as Gordon (2000), also begin with Kendrick.  I 
continue in that tradition although, in contrast to other papers (Field, 2003; 2006a,b; 2007 
a,b,c,d), I focus here on data for the private domestic economy as well as the private 
nonfarm economy, because of the important contribution of agriculture in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.   
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What does it mean empirically to say that “almost all” growth can be swept back to 
inputs conventionally measured?  In an article coauthored with Paul David in 1973, 
Abramovitz wrote that  “…over the course of the nineteenth century the pace of increase 
of the real gross domestic product was accounted for largely by that of the traditional, 
conventionally defined factors of production….  The long term growth rate of total factor 
productivity lay in a low range from .4 to .6 percent per annum” (Abramovitz and David, 
1973, p. 429).  They didn’t argue that technological change was unimportant in raising 
output per hour but rather that its effects weren’t necessarily apparent in TFP growth.  
Instead, they saw technical change as inducing a rise in the post Civil War saving rate by 
increasing the return to investment, and thus influencing the growth in output per hour by 
affecting the rate of capital deepening.  Whatever the merits of this position, and whether 
or not a rise in the saving rate was a response to higher returns, an aim of this paper is to 
show that TFP growth was in fact quite robust from the 1870s through the first decade of 
the twentieth century. 
 Abramovitz and David reported TFP growth of .5 percent per year between 1855 
and 1905, with approximately .3 percent per year up through 1890, accelerating to .8 
percent between 1890 and 1905 (Abramovitz and David, 1973, p. 430).  The authors did 
not present the numbers, in levels, that underlay their growth calculations,2 which makes 
it difficult to ask of the data questions others than those they posed.  They promised that 
“the full body of data (would) be presented for examination in a later publication” 
(Abramovitz and David, 1973, p. 431), but this promise has been only partially met.  
Some modifications in reported growth rates were, however, made in subsequent 
publications.  The main change appears to have been recalculation for the private 
                                                 
2 Output for example, was based on unpublished worksheets from Robert Gallman.  See Rhode  (2002). 
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domestic economy, as opposed to a somewhat larger aggregate in the earlier work.  They 
reported TFP growth rates for the private domestic economy between 1855 and 1890 as 
.36 percent per year (Abramovitz, 1993, p. 223) or .37 percent per year (Abramovitz and 
David, 2000, p. 20). 
A rate of TFP increase of .37 percent per year for 35 years is pretty low, and implies 
a total rise in the level of TFP over the period of less than 14 percent.  Can this rate of 
growth be made consistent with the estimate of 1.22 percent per year between 1873.5 and 
1892 derived from the Kendrick data (see Table 1 below)?   That rate running from 
1873.5 to 1890 would have raised the level of TFP by a total of more than 22 percent.  So 
for the Abramovitz and David numbers to be consistent with those reflected in Table 1, 
derived from Kendrick, TFP would have had to have fallen between 1855 and 1873.5., at 
a rate approaching -.4 percent per year.   
Precisely that possibility is in fact acknowledged in Abramovitz’s presidential 
address to the Economic History Association, where he breaks down the 1855-90 epoch 
into two subperiods, reporting TFP growth for the PDE of -.4 percent per year between 
1855 and 1871 and 1.00 percent per year between 1871 and 1890 (with .91 percent per 
year between 1890 and 1905) (Abramovitz, 1993, p. 228).  He acknowledges that these 
subperiod calculations present potential problems for his interpretation: 
Those who prefer to form their view from the shorter long swings would look 
instead to the figures in Table 2.  One might then tell a somewhat different tale.  
One might then say that the years when the growth of capital intensity was the 
dominant contribution to labor productivity growth were the mid century years, 
from 1835 to 1871. One might argue that a transition toward a development 
pattern resembling that of the present century began during the last quarter of the 
last century.  And one would be supported in this view by the facts that in those 
years TFP became much larger…”  (Abramovitz, 1993, pp. 227-28).   
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This reference to a possible alternative to what has become the standard narrative is, 
however, absent in Abramovitz and David (2000), where we are again given data only for 
the very long periods 1855-1890 and 1890-1927. 3  The low reported TFP growth 
between 1855 and 1890 obscures robust gilded age TFP advance because it combines the 
influence of the years 1855-1871, in which TFP fell, with a post 1871 period in which it 
rose.  
As noted, the first part of this period, 1855 -1871, is one in which, according to 
Abramovitz, TFP fell at -.4 percent per year, which means that the level of TFP was 
about 6 percent lower in 1871 than it had been in 1855.  Why might this have been?  The 
impact of the Civil War is a plausible explanation.  War can push technological frontiers 
forward in certain areas, but its overall impact is likely to be retardative.  With over 
600,000 fatalities in a population of roughly 31 million, with widespread physical 
destruction in the South, and with the wrenching changes associated with the demise of 
the peculiar institution, it is hardly surprising that the progress of innovation was set 
back.  War requires sharp but transient dislocations of an economy, and while it is true 
that challenge or adversity can sometimes stimulate invention, war, on balance, does not 
generally provide a fertile environment for scientific, technical, and organizational 
progress (Field, 2000b; for an alternate view see Ruttan, 2006).   
Understanding Abramovitz’s estimate of .37 for TFP growth in the PDE between 
1855 and 1890 as resulting from the combination of -.4 percent per year from 1855 
through 1871 followed by 1.00 percent per year from 1871 through 1890, numbers which 
are similar to those in Table 1 below, we have the foundation, as Abramovitz recognized, 
                                                 
3Editing by Cambridge University Press apparently eliminated the detailed appendix tables that would have 
included the sub period calculations (personal communication from Paul David).  My point, however, is as 
much about narrative as it is about data.  It remains true that the view into an alternate interpretation of the 
19th century data, which one finds in Abramovitz (1993), is absent in Abramovitz and David (2000).   
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for a rather different narrative.  As Kendrick’s data show, and as Abramovitz 
acknowledged in 1993, TFP growth following the Civil War was robust by absolute 
standards.  And as I will show, it was substantially higher than that experienced in a 
comparable period of the twentieth century. 
Before moving to that task, a quick look backward, prior to the Civil War.  It’s clear 
from the analysis of the subperiod data that the post-1871 TFP growth rates pose 
difficulties for the Abramovitz-Solow narrative.  This is less true for the 1835-1871 data, 
as presented by Abramovitz.  The growth rate over that 36 year period also reflects the 
combined influence of two subperiods, the first between 1835 and 1855, in which growth 
of output per hour was largely attributable to capital deepening, and the second, as noted, 
in which TFP fell.  Abramovitz has TFP essentially unchanged between 1835 and 1855, 
dropping at -.01 percent per year over the period (1993, p. 228). Perhaps this was due to 
the relatively modest rate of advance (compared to the post bellum period) in scientific, 
technical, and organizational knowledge and practice.  
Prior to Fort Sumter, the fundamentals of telegraphic and railroad technology were 
established, and the country began to build nationwide networks for both.  But only 
30,000 miles of rail had been put in place on the eve of the Civil War, as opposed to a 
quarter million miles of main track on the eve of the First World War, and the first 
transcontinental telegraph line was completed only in 1861.  The influence of modern 
business enterprise was still modest.  Railroads, the most important sector in which that 
organizational innovation would be applied, still comprised a relatively small portion of 
overall output.  And until nationwide networks of railroad and telegraphic 
communication were filled in, the technical preconditions for the spread of modern 
business enterprise to distribution and some sectors of manufacturing were incomplete.  
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The Abramovitz/David calculations, relatively more conjectural for the earlier part of the 
nineteenth century, show TFP roughly unchanged between 1835 and 1855 before 
declining across the Civil War period. 
Chart 1 
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But the concern of this paper is with the postwar years, the period imprecisely 
known as the gilded age – extending from the mid 1870s up through the business cycle 
peak in 1906. And the basic data in Kendrick – and Abramovitz and David’s analysis of 
subperiod data -- support a conclusion of robust TFP growth over these years.  Kendrick 
provides us with annual data starting in 1889, and prior to that, with estimates for 1869-
78 and 1879-88.  On chart 1 I have plotted the logged values of Kendrick’s TFP estimates 
for the first two decadal averages and then annually through 1907, along with the logged 
values of private domestic economy multifactor productivity (TFP) for 1973-2005 from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.  The relative position of these groups of data is 
not of interest here, because the index numbers in the two clusters of data use different 
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base years.  What is relevant are the relative slopes evident in the two groups of data.  
Visual inspection suggests a steeper slope, and thus faster rate of growth, in the earlier 
period, an impression confirmed by running a time trend through each cluster. 
Ideally, in comparing growth rates in different periods, we would like to measure 
peak to peak, with each peak at or close to potential output, so as to control for the 
procyclicality of TFP ( Field, 2007d).  The NBER dates a strong business cycle peak in 
May of 1907; Lebergott’s annual unemployment series, as well as Romer’s filtered series, 
bottom out in 1906 (Lebergott, 1964; Romer, 1986).  This is clearly the end of an 
important expansion.    Because the 1869-78 observation includes roughly two complete 
peak to trough cycles according to the NBER chronology (June 1869 – December 1870 
and October 1873 to March 1879), an estimate for the average over that period cannot be 
interpreted as corresponding to a business cycle peak.  A calculation from the initial 
observation (treating it as corresponding to 1873.5, the midpoint of the interval) to 1906 
shows compound annual growth of TFP of 1.44 percent per year.  If TFP was procyclical, 
however, this growth rate estimate will be biased upward, because the initial data point 
cannot be treated as corresponding to a peak. 
A better estimate is obtained by regressing the log of TFP from 1873.5 through 
1907 on a time trend, which yields an estimate of annual TFP growth of 1.23.  A 
relatively straightforward peak to peak estimate runs from 1892 to 1906 (both troughs in 
the annual unemployment estimates).  This yields a rate of 1.24 percent per year for that 
subperiod, at least 50 percent higher than the .8 percent suggested by Abramovitz and 
David in their 1973 article for 1890-1905,4 and substantially higher than rates registered 
                                                 
4 Abramovitz (1993) reported TFP growth of 1 percent per year between 1871 and 1890 and .91 percent per 
year for the PDE between 1890 and 1905 (1993, p. 228). 
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over a comparable period at the end of the twentieth century (.87 percent per year from 
1973 through 2005).  Abramovitz and David used five year averages centered on years 
they considered peaks.  The choice of beginning and endpoints matters in avoiding 
cyclical confounds, and on this score 1892 and 1906 – both troughs in annual 
unemployment series, are on this score more defensible than 1890 and 1905.5   
The rate of TFP growth implied for the period from after the Civil War to 1892 is 
more than three times higher than what Abramovitz and David report for the entire period 
1855-1890, although much closer to the 1 percent per year Abramovitz reported for 1871-
1890 in his Presidential address. These data also suggest the absence of a major 
discontinuity in TFP growth rates from the end of the Civil War to the 1906 business 
cycle peak.6  In contrast with the rapid growth prior to 1906, there follows afterwards a 
substantial slowdown in TFP growth through 1919, prior to the TFP experience of the 
1920s, which, as I have shown elsewhere (Field, 2006a), is almost entirely due to 
advance in manufacturing. 
TFP displays its fastest growth between 1929 and 1941.  The calculated growth 
rates over the periods 1929-1941 and 1941-1948 are based on a cyclically adjusted level 
                                                 
5 There are, as the text notes, a set of issues about whether 1892 and 1906 are to be preferred to 1890 and 
1905 as business cycle peaks.  Another set of issues involves the 5 year averaging method.  This is sensible 
if the most important problem is simply noise in the data.  But it is more difficult to defend in the presence 
of strong cyclical effects.  Consider comparing a sharp business cycle peak, with steep drop offs on either 
side, with a rounded one (close to potential output on either side). In such an environment, measuring 
between 5 year averages centered on the peaks may give a less meaningful estimate of TFP advance than 
simply measuring between peaks.  The averaging method would, in the above instance, give a result which 
is biased upward in the presence of procyclical TFP, because the initial period level would be brought 
down by the lower TFP on either side of the peak more than would the end period level.  These issues of 
method and dating are, however, probably minor in terms of the larger argument of this paper.  Whether 
TFP growth averaged closer to 1 percent or closer to 1.2 percent a year over the gilded age is in some sense 
beside the point, since both numbers reflect robust advance relative, for example, to growth at the end of 
the twentieth century. 
6 The identification of a peak can differ depending on the frequency of data  examined.  For monthly data, 
one would say May 1907; for quarterly data , 1907:2, but for annual data, 1906, because this is the year for 
which the estimates of the annual unemployment rate bottom out. 
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for 1941, but this characterization holds even without the adjustment (see footnote a to 
Table 1 and Field, 2007b).    
Table 1 
TFP Growth estimates, United States, Private Domestic Economy, 1869/78-2005 
 
1869/78-1892a 1.23 
1892-1906 1.24 
1906-1919   .85 
1919-1929 1.97 
1929-1941b 2.66 
1941-1948b   .84 
1948-1973 2.13 
1973-1989   .53 
1989-2000   .93 
2000-2005 1.83 
 
a   This estimate is based on a regression of logged values of TFP from 1869-78 though 1907 which yields 
a trend growth rate of 1.23 percent per year.  Since the first two observations are averages for ten year 
periods, and assuming some procyclicality of TFP over this year, this is probably a slight overestimate, 
since the initial period included almost two complete peak to trough cycles (see text). A straight calculation 
for this period from the Kendrick data, centering 1869-78 on 1873.5, yields 1.59 percent per year, which 
may partly reflect some procyclicality in TFP or remaining recovery from the Civil War.  The 1892-1906 
calculation is defensible as peak to peak, since both years represented troughs in the annual unemployment 
series.  The main conclusion is that TFP advance in the post Civil War decades prior to 1892 was not 
dissimilar to that experienced between 1892 and 1906. 
b  These growth rates are based on a cyclically adjusted TFP level for 1941.  Unemployment in 1941 was 
still 9.9 percent, and TFP was strongly procyclical over the years 1929-41 (as it has been for more than a 
century – see Field 2000d), suggesting that its level would have been higher had the economy been closer 
to full employment in the last year before full scale war mobilization.  The adjustment is made, using data 
from 1929 to 1941, by regressing the TFP growth rate from the previous year (difference in natural logs) on 
the change in the unemployment rate (percentage points), and then using the coefficient on change in 
unemployment to calculate what 1941 PDE TFP would have been had the economy been at potential 
output, defined as the 3.8 percent unemployment experienced in 1948.  The regression results are: 
 
                                  ∆TFP =         .0270    -    .0077* ∆UR 
          R2 = .660      (3.53)       (-4.41) 
               (t statistics in parentheses; data are for 1929-41; n = 12) 
 
There is a 6.1 percentage point difference between actual 1941 unemployment (9.9 percent) and 
unemployment at potential output  (the 3.8 percent of 1948); implying that 1941 TFP would have been 4.7 
percent higher than in fact it was had the economy been fully employed.  The unadjusted growth rates, 
calculated directly from Table A-XXII of Kendrick, are 2.27 percent per year for 1929-1941, and 1.51 
percent per year for 1941-1948.  For application of this methodology to data on the private nonfarm 
economy, see below and additional discussion in Field (2007b). 
 
Source:  1869/78 - 1948:  Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII.  1948-2000.  www.bls.gov, accessed January 26, 
2006; 2000-2005, www.bls.gov, accessed October 18, 2006. 
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From 1948 onward, data are from the BLS website.  The logged values of TFP 
(MFP) levels from the BLS website from 1973 through 2005 are also plotted on chart 1.  
Peak to peak calculations for 1973-89 yield .53 percent per years, increasing to .93 
percent per year from 1989 to 2000 and to 1.83 percent per year between 2000 and 2005.  
For the entire 1973-2005 period, the compound annual growth rate is .87 percent per 
year. 
These data show that TFP growth rates in the last part of the nineteenth century 
were far stronger than the narrative we have come to accept suggests, and substantially 
higher than they were during corresponding years in the twentieth century. This 
comparison and reframing is important, because it offers the possibility of reconciling 
what has become a troubling disconnect in the teaching of U.S. economic history.  How 
could it be that the build out of the transcontinental railway and telegraph networks and 
the development of modern business enterprise (Chandler 1977, Field, 1987), which both 
enabled and was in turn enabled by these new technologies, had so little imprint on the 
TFP data?  How could it have been that the new technologies of the second industrial 
revolution, such as Bessemer and Siemens-Martin open hearth steel, the Bonsack 
cigarette making machine, or the disassembly line pioneered by Swift in meat packing, 
left so little trace on the data?  Add to this David and Wright’s argument that advance in 
mineral extraction was heavily dependent on a knowledge base developed and 
transmitted in universities, schools of mines, and professional associations (David and 
Wright, 1997), as well as the dependence of the growth of American agricultural output 
on biological innovation resulting from government sponsored R and D (Olmstead and 
Rhode, 2002), and there is a real puzzle.  
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Table 2 
TFP Growth estimates, United States, Private Nonfarm Economy, 1869/78-2004 
 
1869/78-1892a 1.95 
1892-1906 1.11 
1906-1919 1.12 
1919-1929 2.02 
1929-1941b 2.78 
1941-1948b   .49 
1948-1973 1.90 
1973-1989   .34 
1989-2000   .78 
2000-2004 1.85 
 
a   This estimate is based on a regression of logged values of PNE TFP from 1869-78 though 1907 which 
yields a trend growth rate of 1.59 percent per year. One needs 1.95 percent per year TFP growth from 
1873.5 to 1892 to make the trend growth rate through 1907 consistent with the peak to peak calculation for 
1892-1906. 
b These growth rates are based on a cyclically adjusted TFP level for 1941 (see note b to Table 1).  The 
adjustment is made, using data from 1929 to 1941, by regressing the PNE TFP growth rate from the 
previous year (difference in natural logs) on the change in the unemployment rate (percentage points), and 
then using the coefficient on change in unemployment to calculate what 1941 PNE TFP would have been 
had the economy been at potential output, defined as the 3.8 percent unemployment experienced in 1948.  
The regression results are: 
 
                                   ∆TFP =         .0283    -    .0092* ∆UR 
          R2 = .647      (3.02)       (-4.28) 
 
               (t statistics in parentheses; data are for 1929-41; n = 12) 
 
The unadjusted growth rates, calculated directly from Table A-XXIII of Kendrick, are 2.31 percent per year 
for 1929-1941, and 1.29 percent per year for 1941-1948.  For additional discussion, see Field (2007b). 
 
Source:  1869/78 - 1948:  Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXIII.  1948-2000.  www.bls.gov, accessed January 
26, 2006, 2000-2004, accessed October 18, 2006. 
 
How can one reconcile the influence of all these factors with the suggestion that 
TFP growth averaged just .5 percent a year from the end of the Civil War into the first 
decade of the twentieth century?  This number obscures the relatively high post 1871 TFP 
growth rates by combining them with the period of falling TFP between 1855 and 1871.  
The commonly quoted generalization that TFP grew at about half a percent a year in the 
post Civil War nineteenth century is inconsistent with the post 1871 data and with what 
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we know qualitatively and at the sectoral level about the evolution of the economy after 
the war.   
Consider first the railroads and Fogel’s 1964 study of their social saving.  Fogel 
concluded that had saving flows been congealed in somewhat inferior capital investments 
(canals, river dredging), U.S. GDP would have been about 4 percent lower in 1890 than it 
was.  Now, 4 percent is not a large number, but neither is it 0, and it can be translated into 
an increment to TFP growth.  Over a 25 year period (1865 to 1890), a .15 percent per 
year increment to TFP growth, continuously compounded, yields a 4 percent boost to 
GNP in 1890.   Suggesting that total TFP growth up through 1890 was in the range of .37 
percent per year, as did Abramovitz and David, leaves only .22 percent per year for 
everything else.  We should not, however, feel obliged to construct our narrative within 
such a tight TFP budget.  
Consider next that the build out of the railway network combined with the 
construction of a transcontinental telegraph network gave rise to perhaps the greatest 
organizational innovation of the last two centuries:  what Chandler (1977) called modern 
business enterprise.  Is there any type of innovation that would be more likely to show up 
in the residual, a measure of disembodied change, than this? The new organizational form 
was critical for the operation of large railway and telegraph corporations.  These 
technologies were also what allowed MBE to be extended from transport and 
communications to distribution and ultimately manufacturing (Field, 1987).   The .15 
percent per year does not account for the spillover effects of the railroad in using sectors, 
most particularly its enabling of MBE.  It will therefore underestimate the railroad’s 
overall contribution to TFP. 
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If we accept the traditional narrative, MBE had apparently little measurable impact 
on TFP growth prior to the First World War. When is it supposed to have had an impact?  
Data from Table 1 for the PDE show TFP growth falling off after 1906. Data from Table 
2 (see below) for the private nonfarm economy show some deceleration in TFP 
comparing 1892-1906 with 1869-92, and Kendrick’s incomplete data for manufacturing 
(see Table 3) show some retardation in that sector as one goes into the first years of the  
twentieth century.  By the time we get to the extraordinary TFP growth in manufacturing 
of the 1920s (1919-1929), MBE is already well established, and the explanatory focus is 
less on organizational innovation.  Rather it has been on the delayed effects of 
electrification, particularly the use of wires as a substitute for mechanical gears and shafts 
in distributing power internally within the factory (Devine, 1973; David and Wright, 
2003; Field, 2007c).  The 1920s manufacturing revolution, moreover, was an across the 
board phenomenon– evidenced in the uniformly high rates of TFP advance at the two 
digit level (see Field, 2006a).  The impact of MBE in manufacturing prior to the First 
World War was far less uniform – quite important in a few key sectors, not so important 
elsewhere.  The same was true for distribution – but not rail transportation, where one 
had to have it.  The data show higher TFP growth in the private nonfarm economy in the 
period from the end of the Civil War up through 1892. This is the more relevant 
aggregate if one is interested in the likely effects of MBE, and the data are consistent 
with its having played a contributing role in robust TFP growth then.  Again, this is 
where Abramovitz’s 1993 pre World War I subperiod data shows the fastest TFP growth. 
To what degree could the discrepancy between the low TFP rates associated with 
the conventional narrative and those in Table 1 have to do with differential accounting for 
the growth of land input?  Kendrick does include land in his estimates of farm capital, 
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which are derived from Tostlebe (1957).  If  Kendrick’s numbers do not adequately 
account for the growth of land input in agriculture, then TFP growth estimates for the 
private domestic economy for the end of the nineteenth century might be too high.  One 
way to explore this possibility is to examine trends in TFP growth rates for the private 
nonfarm economy, for which the growth of land inputs is presumably less directly 
relevant. 
To estimate TFP growth rates for the private nonfarm economy from the end of the 
Civil War up to 1892 I employ a methodology similar to that used for the private 
domestic economy.  First, run a time trend through the logged values of Kendrick’s PNE 
data, centering 1869-78 on 1873.5 and 1879-1888 on 1883.5.  This yields 1.59 percent 
per year, continuously compounded from 1873.5 through 1907.  Second, do a relatively 
clean peak to peak measure between 1892 and 1906, which yields 1.11 percent per year.  
Third, ask what growth rate one would have needed between 1873.5 and 1892 to be 
consistent with the results of the first calculation.  The answer is 1.95 percent per year.  
This suggests strong TFP growth in the private nonfarm economy before 1892, 
moderating thereafter.  Keep in mind that 1.11 percent per year between 1892 and 1906 is 
still substantially higher than what was registered in the U.S. twentieth century economy 
from 1973 onward.  Whereas the Abramovitz and David narrative proposes accelerating 
TFP after 1890 (.8 percent per year rather than .3 percent earlier), Table 2 suggest some 
deceleration for the private nonfarm economy comparing the years before and after 1892. 
Table 1 showed rough constancy for the private domestic economy; the differences have 
to with some acceleration in TFP growth in agriculture comparing 1892-1906 with the 
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earlier period.7  Neither Table 1 nor Table 2 is consistent, however, with notable 
acceleration after 1890.  The Abramovitz and David suggestion of .3 percent up through 
1890 and .8 percent from 1890 through 1905 is, again, potentially misleading, because 
the .3 (or .37 percent) from 1855 through 1890 is a productivity growth estimate dragged 
down by declining productivity across the Civil War period. 
The data on sectoral productivity trends is less complete than that for the aggregate 
measures, but what is available help us flesh out the underpinnings of what we are 
picking up in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 3 shows rates of TFP growth in mining, manufacturing, and telephone and 
telegraphs.  These data suggest that the biggest gains in manufacturing came in the 1880s, 
after which growth slowed before the huge acceleration after 1919.  In mining, the 1890s 
appear to have been a particularly fertile period (see David and Wright, 1997), and we 
also see an acceleration for agriculture.  Progress in communication remains relatively 
strong throughout. 
Table  3 
TFP Growth in Mining, Manufacturing, and Telephone and Telegraphs, 1869-1919 
 
 Mining Manufacturing Tel. and Tel. 
1869-79  .86  
1879-89 1.24 1.94 2.30 
1889-99 2.49 1.12 1.27 
1899-1909 .77 .72 3.98 
1909-1919 1.39 .28 1.35 
               Source:  Kendrick, 1961, Tables  C-III, D-1,   H-III. 
 
The relatively strong gains in manufacturing during the 1880s likely reflect the 
contribution of modern business enterprise.  The 1880s were a big decade for the 
expansion of such MBE intensive subsectors as steel, cigarettes, meatpacking, and 
                                                 
7 TFP in agriculture grew at a rate of 1.57 percent per year between 1892 and 1906 as compared with .56 
percent per year between 1869 and 1892 (Kendrick, 1961, Table B-1). 
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petroleum refining.  Use of this organizational form required the availability of reliable 
railroad and telegraph service, and was necessary in manufacturing to exploit economies 
dependent not just upon scale per se but on ensuring high levels of capacity utilization 
and rates of inventory turnover. 
Finally, the growth of total factor productivity in railroads was very strong 
throughout the post Civil War period – higher than the rate of growth in the economy-
wide aggregates and thus a significant contributor to them.  Much of this represented the 
consequence of a continuing process of technical change resulting in larger locomotives 
and rolling stock, air brakes, and automatic couplers (Fishlow, 1966). But much, 
including the economically successful exploitation of such improvements, reflected and 
depended upon the contribution of modern business enterprise – the organizational form 
that allowed the operation of private enterprises whose size and dominance in the 
economy had never been witnessed before and has never been seen since.  MBE was an 
absolute requirement in the business of railroad transportation, especially on a largely 
single tracked system, whereas MBE was adopted only in portions of the distribution and 
manufacturing sectors (Field 1992).  The high penetration within the railroad sector was 
unmatched elsewhere, with the possible exception of telephone and telegraphs, which 
also exhibited TFP growth above that registered in the economy wide aggregates (see 
Table 3). 
Table 4 also includes data on the growth rates of labor and capital productivity 
(TFP growth rates are a weighted average of the two). Readers may be surprised by the 
relative rates of increase of labor and capital productivity as well the respective sectoral 
increases in capital and manhours associated with them.  Although the capital output ratio 
for the economy rose (in other words, capital productivity went down), in part as the 
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consequence of the enormous accumulation in railroads, the situation within the sector 
itself was quite different.  The sector of the economy most thoroughly penetrated by 
MBE generated rates of increase of capital productivity averaging over 5 percent per year 
from 1873.5 through 1906.  Aside from assuring that trains didn’t collide, an event which 
is, one might say, capital using, advanced logistical control contributed to rises in capital 
productivity by enabling higher utilization rates on fixed capital and rolling stock.  One 
can interpret this simply as a scale economy, but the ability of a system to generate low 
costs at high volume is beside the point if volume cannot be managed and sustained at 
those levels.  This required increases in labor input even more rapid than those of capital.   
    Table 4 
Productivity Growth in Railroads, 1873.5-1919 
 
 TFP Output/hour Output/unit 
of capital 
1873.5-1883.5 4.25 3.58 5.75 
1883.5-1892 2.33 1.86 4.98 
1892-1906 2.56 1.82 5.31 
1906-1919 3.02 3.33 1.70 
 
                                               Source:  Kendrick, 1961, Table G-III. 
 
Whereas capital in railroads grew at 1.96 percent per year between 1873.5 and 
1906, manhours rose at 4.92 percent per year (Kendrick, 1961, Table G-III, p. 543).8  In 
other words, in railroad enterprises, capital shallowed at a rate of about 3 percent a year, 
one of the reasons capital productivity went up so much. In contrast, for the private 
domestic economy as a whole, capital grew at 3.76 percent per year and manhours at 2.75 
percent per year between 1873.5 and 1906, so capital was deepening at a rate of about 1 
                                                 
8 Fishlow (1966) is critical of Ulmer’s data which underlie Kendrick’s railroad capital stock indices.  But 
even Fishlow’s data indicate capital shallowing in railroads, although not to the same degree.  Between 
1870 and 1910, he has persons engaged growing at 5 percent per year, while capital grew at 4.5 percent per 
year.  Fishlow, 1966, Table 10, p. 626.   
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percent per year (Kendrick, 1961, Table A-XXII).9  The trends within the railroad sector 
are testimony to the degree to which modern business enterprise is a capital saving 
innovation.  MBE uses labor and saves capital (Field, 1987), and this characteristic is 
especially evident in sectors where the organizational form had its deepest penetration. 
The need to insure high volume flows is central to Chandler’s emphasis on the 
importance of throughput, whether he is discussing transportation, communication, 
distribution, or manufacturing.  Modern business enterprise, in the context of the new 
railroad and telegraph technologies, represented a decisive break with prior modes of 
business practice.  There were no modern business enterprises in 1840.  In The Visible 
Hand (1977) Chandler suggests that if a contemporary business manager were 
transported back to 1910 he would be pretty much at home in the organizational and 
management environment, but if he were transported back to 1840, he would be in a 
different world, and might as well go back to the fifteenth century.   
Modern business enterprises employ a multidivisional structure, depend on 
management information systems, and are run by a cadre of professional managers.  
Nineteenth century MBEs used the telegraph to move information quickly, the typewriter 
to create and maintain administrative office records, and the vertical file to store them.  
The linotype machine and innovations in making cheap paper from wood pulp spelled 
dramatic reductions in the cost of mass media, which were in turn increasingly utilized by 
department stores, mail order houses, and manufacturers to stimulate demand for their 
products or services through advertising. 
                                                 
9 For the private nonfarm economy, capital grew at 4.99 percent per year, manhours at 3.46 percent 
between 1873.5 and 1906, so capital deepened at more than 1.5 percent per year (Kendrick, 1961, Table A-
XXIII. 
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MBE developed first in the railroads.  The telegraph industry also faced an 
imperative to manage high speed traffic, and employed MBE as well.  The organizational 
form then spread to wholesale and retail distribution, giving rise to such new institutions 
as the department store and the mail order house.  Finally, it was adopted in a limited 
number of subsectors of the industrial sector – in such businesses as steel, cigarette 
manufacturing, petroleum refining, meatpacking, and sewing machines/typewriters.  
MBE made possible and in turn was technologically dependent on nationwide systems of 
telegraph communication and railroad transportation. You could not have MBE without 
the telegraph, and there was no rationale for it without the railroad. 
The hypothesis that the diffusion of MBE is implicated in TFP increases is not 
simply speculative:  it leads to testable predictions.  The historical narrative is reasonably 
clear with respect to where the organizational form did and did not take root prior to 
World War I:  almost 100 percent in railroads and telegraphs, in parts of distribution 
(department stores, mail order houses) and in part but by no means all of the 
manufacturing sector (steelmaking, cigarette manufacture, meatpacking, petroleum 
refining, sewing machines/typewriter/firearm assembly) (Chandler, 1977; Field, 1987).  
The hypothesis predicts that in sectors wholly or partially penetrated by MBE, one should 
see TFP growth stronger than in the economy as a whole.  The data in Tables 3 and 4 are 
largely consistent with this hypothesis. TFP growth in railroads and telegraphs was above 
the economy wide average throughout the period in question.  In manufacturing this was 
so in the 1880s and especially the 1890s.  Data for the distribution sector are also 
consistent with this view (see Field, 1996). 
Chandler’s principal focus was on organizational innovation.  In a somewhat 
similar vein, Vaclav Smil has recently explored the contributions of late nineteenth 
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century scientific and technical advance to twentieth century growth.  His main thesis, 
which bears similarities with Chandler’s, is that the four decades prior to the first World 
War contributed to a decisive break with the past:  
…the fundamental means to realize nearly all of the 20th century accomplishments 
were put in place before the century began, mostly during the three closing 
decades of the 19th century and in the years preceding WW1.  That period ranks 
as history’s most remarkable discontinuity not only because of the extensive 
sweep of its innovations but also because of the rapidity of fundamental advances 
that were achieved during that time (Smil, 2005, pp. 5-6). 
 
A good deal of what Smil goes on to describe represented larder stocking: the 
establishment of foundations upon which was predicated future progress.  But much of 
the advance had an immediate impact:   “Many pre WW1 innovations were patented, 
commercialized and ready to be diffused in a matter of months (telephone, lightbulbs) or 
a few years (gasoline powered cars, synthesis of ammonia) after their conceptualization 
or experimental demonstration”  (Smil, 2005, p. 9).  Thus TFP growth between the Civil 
and First World Wars can be interpreted as reflecting the influence of contemporaneous 
scientific and technical progress combined and sometimes interacting with the effect of 
evolutionary improvement of systems such as the railroad and the telegraph whose 
foundations had been established prior to the Civil War.  Rapidly commercialized 
breakthroughs and progress building upon earlier foundations meant that scientific, 
technical, and organization advance during this period had an impact on the way people 
lived then, as well as on how they would live after the First World War 
 In language similar to Chandler’s, Smil writes that:  “The enormity of the post 
1860 saltation was such that people alive in 1913 were further away from the world of 
their great-grandparents who lived in 1813 than those were from their ancestors in 1513”.  
He makes a similar point about scientific progress, arguing that if one transported the 
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distinguished French chemist Lavoisier forward to the early twentieth century, much of 
what he would have seen would have been incomprehensible to him.  In contrast, 
transport Edison, Fessenden, Haber, or Parsons (developer of the turbogenerator) to the 
early twenty first century and they’d be on top of what they were seeing – indeed, they 
would have provided the scientific and technical foundations for much of it (Smil, 2005, 
pp. 28, 296). 
TFP advance in any given period results from the exploitation of technical systems 
whose foundations have been laid earlier and from the rapid commercialization of new 
products and processes resulting from contemporaneous scientific and technical progress.  
Some of that progress will, however, not be immediately exploited, thus replenishing the 
cupboard for subsequent periods.  One needs to acknowledge the importance of larder 
stocking without suggesting that scientific and technical progress had little influence on 
living standards or productivity growth rates prior to the First World War.10  
Clearly, the mix of larder stocking and immediate impact varied across the different 
areas of advancement examined by Smil.  For example, his exposition gives pride of 
place to electricity, and we can consider its impact in providing motive power in 
manufacturing.  A small steam engine, he argued, could convert only about 4 percent of 
coal’s energy into power, of which 60 percent was lost in the process of mechanical 
transmission to the work station via overhead shafts and belts.  The transmission system, 
moreover, had to be shut down typically for about 10 percent of the time for 
                                                 
10 Again, to be fair to Abramovitz and David, they never made this argument in precisely these terms.  But 
they did argue that virtually all of the influence of technological advance on output per hour worked 
through a rate of profit/ interest rate mechanism, encouraging higher saving flows and faster rates of 
physical capital deepening.  A corollary was that little of the influence of technological advance was 
evident in TFP growth.  
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maintenance.  So we are dealing with energy efficiency of about 1.4 percent (.04*.4*.9) 
for steam generated power distributed mechanically within a factory.  
In contrast, by the time of the First World War, electricity produced with a 
turbogenerator had an energy conversion efficiency of about 10 percent.  Assuming 10 
percent of this was lost in transmission, and the use of a direct drive electric motor with 
85 percent efficiency, we have overall energy efficiency of almost 8 percent (.1*.9*.85) – 
a five fold improvement.  Removing the straightjacket of mechanical distribution of 
power also allowed substantial savings on floor space and the possibility of moving to 
single story rather than multiple story installations. 
The conventional narrative argues, however, probably correctly, that most of the 
gains from this source were not realized until the 1920s, and indeed underlay the fabulous 
– more than 5 percent per year – growth of TFP in the manufacturing sector between 
1919 and 1929 (see Kendrick, 1961; Devine, 1983; David and Wright, 2003; Field, 
2007c). So whereas it would be fair  to say that prewar advances in systems of power 
generation laid the foundation for post World War I advance in manufacturing TFP, it is 
unlikely that a great deal of the prewar TFP growth can be attributed to the electrification 
of industry, at least with respect to motive power. Note that within manufacturing, the 
Kendrick data suggest the fastest gains in the 1880s, certainly well before any of this 
could have had much effect. 
The situation is quite different, however, with respect to space lighting and traction.  
By 1900 there were over 1,000 central power stations in the U.S.  Much of the demand 
these stations satisfied was residential, but some was also in commerce and 
manufacturing, particularly in industries such as textiles where electric lighting offered 
much lower probabilities of inducing explosions than did gas and facilitated expanded 
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shift work.  By absolute standards incandescent bulbs were and still are quite inefficient 
in turning energy into light, but in comparison to candles or gas, they represented a big 
improvement.  Smil estimated that candles converted .01 percent of paraffin’s chemical 
energy into light, and coal gas no more than .05 percent.  By 1913 tungsten filaments 
converted 2 percent of electric energy into light.  With 10 percent generation efficiency 
and 10 percent transmission losses, energy efficiency had risen to .18 percent (.1*.9*.02), 
still very low but more than three times that of coal gas.  The efficiency of converting 
coal into electric power benefited from very rapid gains in the electricity generating 
sector, involving the switch from the use of steam engines to drive dynamos to the use of 
steam turbines linked inline with a generator or alternator.  As the result of improvements 
in bulbs, and power generation, as well as reductions in loss due to transmission, the cost 
of household lighting fell 90 percent in just two decades between 1892 and 1912.  Steam 
engines themselves underwent substantial improvements, with energy efficiency for new 
large stationary installations rising from 6 - 10 percent in the 1860s to 12-15 percent after 
1900 (Smil, 2005, pp. 289-90). 
If direct drive motors were slow to find their way into manufacturing, that was not 
true in traction.  Edison’s Pearl Street station opened in 1882. By 1893 14 out of 16 cities 
with population greater than 200,000 had electric traction streetcars as did 41 of 42 cities 
with population between 50,000 and 200,000 (Dyer and Martin, 1929, cited in Smil, 
2005, p. 94). 
A second area upon which Smil focused is materials.  David Landes (1969, p. 259) 
noted that the real cost of steel fell 80- 90 percent between the early 1860s and the mid-
1890s.  Crude oil in the United States in 1910 cost 10 percent of what it had in real terms 
in the 1860s.  With the invention of the Hall-Herout reduction process, the real cost of 
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aluminum fell 90 percent between 1890 and 1913, although the use of this advanced 
material in the economy was still very small.  (Smil, 2005, pp. 155, 292).  These cost 
reductions are the duals of productivity advance in the respective sectors, and they are the 
consequence of more simply than the effects of capital deepening. 
All of the foundational work on the gasoline powered internal combustion engine 
was done prior to the First World War. Although this was largely larder stocking, with 
most of the big productivity gains in the use of self propelled vehicles yet to come, some 
gains were already beginning to be reaped prior to the war.  In 1913 the operating cost of 
a truck was 40 percent that of a horse drawn vehicle, garaging costs alone were barely 15 
percent of the analogous space requirements for a horse (Perry, 1913, cited in Smil, 2005, 
p. 288).  The same economics can be applied to the use of electric power for purposes of 
traction.  Ultimately, the replacement of horsepower with the gasoline engine would free 
a substantial portion of American crop acreage for purposes other than producing feed for 
animals. 
Similarly, although the scientific and technical foundations for radio and moving 
pictures were established prior to the war, much of the realization of gains associated 
with it took place subsequently. 
Smil argued that most of the important scientific and technical foundations for 
twentieth century economic growth were established in the two generations prior to 
WWI. We can acknowledge that much of the impact on aggregate productivity was not 
felt until later in the twentieth century, particularly the interwar years (Field, 2006a,b, 
2007a), and also recognize that much, such as Bessemer and Siemens-Martin steel, did 
have an immediate impact.  We can also acknowledge that much productivity growth and 
living standard improvement in the years from 1871 through 1906 was influenced by 
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spillovers from the build out of the railroad and telegraph networks, technologies whose 
foundations were laid pre Civil War, as well as rapid productivity growth within those 
sectors themselves.   
Spillovers took the form of innovations in business organization that allowed new 
ways of doing business in using sectors.  Some examples:  the telegraph enabled the 
development of a system of stock trading after the Civil War that persisted in essentially 
unaltered form for almost a century – breaking down only in 1968 (Field 1998).  The 
telegraph and the railroad were essential technical preconditions for the revolution in 
meat packing and distribution engineered by Swift and Co. and its competitors.   
Carnegie’s steel making revolution depended on the railroad and telegraph for its 
logistical operation (and railroads played an important role in stimulating the demand for 
his product).  The development of the American Tobacco Company and exploitation of 
the Bonsack cigarette making machine is inconceivable without the railroad and the 
telegraph, as is Rockefeller’s success with Standard Oil.  In all these cases: stock trading, 
beef and pork packing, steel, cigarettes, and petroleum products, we see very substantial 
declines in real prices. 
In the two generations prior to the First World War scientific advance became 
increasingly important as an underpinning of economic growth.  For the first time in 
history technical advance depended substantially on an understanding of scientific 
principles, including modern chemistry, which underlay the Haber-Bosch process for 
synthesizing ammonia, the laws of thermodynamics, which were critical in improvements 
in the efficiency of steam engines, as well as the development of steam turbines, and 
advances in understanding electromagnetism, which underlay breakthroughs in wireless 
communication as well as the development of improved electric motors. If modern 
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business enterprise was the most important institutional innovation in this period, a good 
candidate for the second would be the industrial research laboratory, which played a role 
in all of the above developments.  As Abramovitz acknowledged, once one looks at the 
subperiod calculations, there is no longer a disconnect between narratives such as Smil’s 
and the aggregate data.  Strong TFP advance after 1871 is consistent with the importance 
of “Knowledge Based Progress” in the last part of the nineteenth century, as it is with the 
major acceleration in per capita patenting rates in the United States after the Civil War 
(Khan and Sokoloff, 2001, p. 239). 
Together, this qualitative and quantitative evidence makes implausible the 
suggestion that economic growth in the gilded age can almost entirely be explained as the 
consequence of the growth of inputs conventionally measured, or that labor productivity 
and living standard advance is virtually entirely to be attributed to capital deepening. The 
macro numbers don’t show this, and such a conclusion is contrary to the impression of 
contemporary observes such as Byrn (1901) that they were living and had lived through 
an historically unique transition, a conclusion affirmed in the judgments of more recent 
writers such as Chandler and Smil. 
Conclusion 
Productivity advance in any period is the consequence of the exploitation of 
technical foundations which have been established earlier and breakthroughs that are 
rapidly commercialized and have their impact within the same epoch.  The period 1871-
1913 is no different in this regard.  The technical foundations for the railroad and the 
telegraph were pre Civil War, although the proximately significant advances that allowed 
for the plummeting prices of steel and aluminum took place after the war.   The rapid 
progress in scientific, technical and organizational knowledge during the two generations 
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prior to the First World War laid the foundations for twentieth century advance, 
particularly that remarkable period between the two world wars.  But it also underlay the 
qualitative and quantitative changes that characterized the epoch – the multifaceted 
improvements that in the minds of so many observers irrevocably separated the world of 
1910 from that a half century earlier. 
Perhaps Edward Byrn can be forgiven some millennial enthusiasm when he wrote 
in 1901 about the century just completed: 
 
The Philosophical mind is ever accustomed to regard all stages of growth as 
proceeding by slow and uniform processes of evolution, but in the field of 
invention the nineteenth century has been unique.  It has been something more 
than a merely normal growth or natural development.  It has been a gigantic tidal 
wave of human ingenuity and resource, so stupendous in its magnitude, so 
complex in its diversity, so profound in its thought, so fruitful in its wealth, so 
beneficent in its results, that the mind is strained and embarrassed in its effort to 
expand to a full appreciation of it.   Indeed the period seems a grand climax of 
discovery, rather than an increment of growth (Byrn, 1901, p. 3). 
 
Edward Bellamy, H.G. Wels, and Jules Verne would have agreed. Macroeconomic 
data are consistent with this interpretation.  They do not support the view that the last part 
of the nineteenth century exhibited exceptionally low rates of increase in total factor 
productivity.  TFP growth averaged, for the private domestic economy, above 1.2 percent 
per year from the early 1870s up through 1906. Such growth was substantially more 
robust than that experienced in the last part of the twentieth century. Revision in our 
macroeconomic narrative for the years between the Civil and First World Wars is 
necessary to reconcile it with these numbers and with what we know about 
organizational, scientific, and technological progress at the sectoral level during the same 
period. 
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